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ABSTRACT 
Informed by a comprehensive review of theories and research into desistance (Weaver, 2015), 
this article advances a critical and contemporary overview of the main theories of desistance, 
drawing on illustrative empirical research. It begins by addressing definitional issues, prior to 
showing how various theories of desistance differently explain the phenomena of giving up 
crime. The article concludes by engaging with its limitations and its relatively muted impact 
on policy and practice. It is argued that desistance research, and its interpretation in both policy 
and practice, remains very individualistic in focus, and often disconnected from specific 
analyses of the cultural and structural contexts in which both offending and desistance take 
place. In considering how this review might inform future research, the article suggests that the 
desistance paradigm might be enhanced by attending to contemporary critiques of its 
limitations. In particular, this would suggest the application of intersectional methods and 
analyses, analyses of divergences in desistance pathways by crime type, enhanced critical and 
contextualizing analyses of cultural and structural influences on desistance, and, beyond 
individual desistance, a focus on the challenges of social integration for people with 
convictions, to better inform and shape penal policy and practice. 
KEYWORDS: Desistance; Literature Review; Giving Up Crime; Understanding Desistance; Theories of 
Desistance 
Introduction 
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The study of desistance is distinct in criminology, in seeking to explain why people cease and 
sustain cessation from offending, rather than why they offend. This article offers a critical 
review of theories of desistance, drawing on empirical research where relevant. It begins by 
addressing definitions of desistance, prior to presenting an overview of the principal theoretical 
explanations of desistance, and latterly engaging with its limitations and its impact on policy 
and practice. It is argued that desistance research, and its interpretation in both policy and 
practice, remains very individualistic in focus, and all too often disconnected from specific 
analyses of the cultural and structural contexts in which both offending and desistance take 
place. Key areas for the development of this research paradigm reside in the application of 
intersectional methods and analyses, analyses of divergences in desistance pathways and 
processes by crime type; enhanced critical and contextualizing analyses of cultural and 
structural influences on both crime and desistance; and, beyond individual desistance, a focus 
on the challenges of social integration for people with convictions, to better inform and shape 
penal policy and practice. 
Definitions of desistance  
Debates surrounding definitions of desistance reflect the diversity of theoretical 
conceptualizations of desistance and the challenges of empirically measuring desistance. While 
the term implies abstinence from offending, criminologists have expanded on this to refer to 
the process by which people come to cease and sustain cessation of offending behavior (e.g. 
Bushway et al., 2001; Laub and Sampson, 2001; Maruna, 2001).  
Shover (1996 p.121) defines desistance as ‘the voluntary termination of serious criminal 
participation’, suggesting that minor incidences of offending does not preclude desistance. 
While empirically vague, it recognizes that desistance is not only a process but that 
participation in low level offending is not uncommon. Most empirical measures of desistance, 
however, emphasize the state of non-offending rather than the process of desistance leading up 
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to that point, typically identifying individuals who evidence a significant crime-free gap in the 
course of a criminal career, essentially redefining desistance as temporary non-offendingii. This 
is due to the practical challenges of verifying permanent cessation of offending (e.g. Bottoms 
et al., 2004), which, it has been suggested, can only be established posthumously (Maruna and 
Farrall, 2004). Bushway et al., (2001) argue that a focus on the final state of non-offending 
neglects to address the process by which individuals arrive there. Alternatively, they propose 
that desistance should be construed as the study of change in criminality (defined as propensity 
to offend), implicit in qualitative accounts of desistance. 
The process of desistance has been characterized in terms of oscillations between conformity 
and criminality in both empirical studies and theoretical accounts of desistance (Glaser, 1964; 
Matza, 1964)iii and as encompassing distinguishable phases. Uggen and Kruttschnitt (1998) 
suggest that desistance has two implicit components: a change from offending to non-offending 
and the arrival at a permanent state of non-offending. Although the idea of permanency is 
problematic, the notion of graduated or distinguishable phases in the process of desistance is 
not without its precedents or antecedents (e.g. Fagan, 1989iv; Loeber and LeBlanc, 1990v; 
Weitekamp and Kerner, 1994vi). Laub and Sampson (2001 p.11) differentiate between 
‘termination’ (the outcome, ‘the time at which criminal activity stops’ (ibid, p. 11)), and 
‘desistance’ (‘the causal process that supports the termination of offending’ (ibid, p. 11)). 
Maruna and Farrall (2004) argue that this conflates the causes of desistance with desistance 
itself, alternatively proposing a dichotomous definition, analogous with Lemert’s (1951) 
conception of primary and secondary deviance. They propose that there are two distinguishable 
phases in the desistance process: primary and secondary desistance. Primary desistance refers 
to any crime free gap in the course of a criminal career. Secondary desistance is defined as the 
movement from the behaviour of non-offending to the adoption of a non-offending role or 
identity (Maruna and Farrall, 2004). More recently, McNeill (2016) proposed the concept of 
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tertiary desistance to denote social recognition of change and the development of a sense of 
belonging. While not intended to be sequential or linear stages in the desistance process, the 
language of primary, secondary and tertiary is all too often, erroneously, interpreted as such. 
For this reason, Nugent and Schinkel (2016: 570) propose more descriptive classifications to 
characterize the same processes, specifically ‘‘act-desistance’ for non-offending, ‘identity 
desistance’ for the internalization of a non-offending identity and ‘relational desistance’ for 
recognition of change by others’. It is now generally accepted that desistance is a process, 
rather than an end-point, and the conceptualization of the desistance process delineated by 
Nugent and Schinkel (2016) is perhaps the clearest in describing and distinguishing between 
key elements of the process, without implying a sense of linearity. 
Theories of desistance 
Criminological interest in desistance developed in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g. Cusson and 
Pinsonneault, 1986; Meisenhelder, 1977, Rand, 1987; Shover, 1983) and became a major area 
of enquiry in criminal career research in the 1990s (e.g. Graham and Bowling, 1995; Maruna, 
1997; Sampson and Laub, 1993). Since this time, a range of theories and empirical studies that 
seek to account for and explain desistance have been advanced. Whilst there are commonalities 
across theories of desistance, not least in their conceptualization of desistance as a process of 
change, they differ in their explanations as to how a person comes to desist, and what supports 
it. For the purpose of classification the theories of desistance are presented under four broad 
headings. The first three echo the classificatory distinctions drawn by Maruna (1997) and Barry 
(2010): namely, individual and agentic; social and structural; and interactionist. The fourth, 
situational, reflects Bottoms’ (2014) more recent assertion that the spatial and situational 
aspects of desistance deserve attention in their own right. ‘Individual and agentic’ theories are 
based on the established links between age and certain criminal behaviors, locating 
explanations of desistance within age and maturational reform theories (or ‘ontogenic 
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theories’); agentic explanations of desistance informed by rational choice theories are also 
subsumed under this category given their emphasis on within-individual cognitive processes. 
‘Social and Structural’ theories include social bonds and social control (or ‘sociogenic’) 
theories which, generally, advance an association between desistance and circumstances 
‘external’ to the individual (although these include the individual’s reaction to, and interaction 
with, those circumstances). Such theories emphasize the significance of ties to family, 
employment or educational programs, which are considered to create a stake in conformity. 
‘Interactionist’ theories include those that attend, to varying degrees, to the interaction between 
individual agency and social structures in their accounts of desistance. Interactionist theories 
broadly emphasize the significance of subjective changes in the person’s sense of self and 
identity, and as part of that, their aspirations, in response to their (changing) social contexts. 
More recently, Bottoms (2014) fourth classification: ‘situational desistance’ illustrates how 
various aspects of people’s social environments and situated ‘routine activities’ also influence 
behavior. 
 
Individual and Agentic Theories of Desistance 
The Age Crime Curve 
Criminal careers research suggests that people begin offending in early adolescence, that rates 
of offending peak in late adolescence or young adulthood and that most people stop offending 
before reaching 30 or 40 years of age, thus construing offending primarily as an age-related 
phenomenon (e.g. Blumstein and Cohen, 1987; Farrington, 1986, 1997). The aggregate age-
crime curve (calculated by dividing the total number of arrests of individuals of a given age by 
the total population size of the specific age) indicates a sharp increase in arrest rates in the early 
teen years, peaking in the late teen or early adult years, and decreasing over the remaining age 
distribution. Such studies consistently report that the age distribution of any population is 
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inversely related to its crime rate (e.g. Hirschi and Gottfredson, 1983; Steffensmeier and Harer, 
1987). 
Debates surrounding this relationship between age and crime hinge on whether the analysis of 
individual-level data evidences the same relationship between age and crime as the analysis of 
aggregate data. Hirschi and Gottfredson (1983) argue that crime is universally inversely related 
to age at both the individual and aggregate levels of analysis; the relationship between age and 
crime is considered to be invariant, meaning that all people, everywhere, within any historical 
period tend to commit less crime as they age regardless of both crime type and individual 
criminal propensity. Blumstein and others (Blumstein and Cohen, 1979, 1987; Blumstein et 
al., 1986; Blumstein, Cohen and Farrington 1988; Farrington, 1983, 1986), however, argue that 
this does not pertain at the individual level of analysis. Rather, they contend that Hirschi and 
Gottfredson confuse changes in participation and incidence rates with changes in the frequency 
of individual offending. A change in either participation or incidence rates affects the shape of 
the curve. As long as people are still active they may continue to commit crimes at a relatively 
constant rate independent of their age; thus, it is argued, changes in aggregate crime rates are 
likely to reflect changes in prevalence (see Farrington, 1986; 1997). Although the aggregate 
age-crime curve is largely driven by changes in the prevalence of offending, there remains 
some disagreement about how the rate of offending changes across the life-span for those 
actively involved in offending, and how this may vary by both offence type and gender. For 
instance, Loeber et al., (2016) using self-report data from the Pittsburgh Youth Study found 
that frequency of offending for men who were active in offending largely followed the 
characteristic age-crime curve. They also identified three age crime trajectories for girls: non-
offenders, low rate and high rate. The frequency of offending for those in the high rate category 
gradually increased between the ages of 11 and 15, incrementally decreasing thereafter and 
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they were much more versatile in their offending than those in the low rate category, engaging 
in both violent and acquisitive crime. 
Moreover, the age crime curve does not reflect divergences across or within crime types. There 
is some evidence to suggest that the traditional age crime curve does not reflect patterns of 
participation in white collar crime (e.g. Piquero and Benson, 2004), and more recent research 
has identified divergences in offending patterns and criminal trajectories across a sample of 
people convicted of white collar crime (e.g. Onna et al., 2014). While the age crime curve 
indicates that age leads to reductions in sex offending behavior, onset and desistance tends to 
occur later than the trajectories implied by the traditional age-crime curve and evidence 
suggests variations in age-graded trajectories by offence-type and differential rates of 
recidivism and desistance within these categories (for a detailed review of this literature, see 
Laws and Ward 2011).  
Maturational Reform 
‘Ontogenic’ or ‘maturational reform’ theories also conclude that people naturally grow out of 
crime. One of the earliest and largest longitudinal studies of crime and desistance was 
undertaken by the Gluecks (Glueck and Glueck, 1940). Their theory of maturational reform 
proposed that ‘the physical and mental changes which enter into the natural process of 
maturation offer a chief explanation of improvement of conduct with passing years’ (Glueck 
and Glueck, 1974 p.149). Thus, for the Gluecks, desistance was not only unaffected by socio-
structural factors but was normative and expected, with exceptions being explained by 
immaturity. Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) similarly suggest that ‘[s]pontaneous desistance is 
just that, change in behaviour that cannot be explained and change that occurs regardless of 
what else happens’ (p. 136, quoted in Laub and Sampson 2001 p.40). They attribute decreases 
in offending over time to biological changes which slow down the individual, reducing the 
motivation and capacity to re-offend. More recent versions of ‘maturational’ approaches have 
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focussed on developing neurobiological systems, rather than biological capacity per se. For 
example, Shulman et al., (2016) review evidence from developmental psychological and 
developmental neuroscientific, neuro-imaging research. They conclude that both psychological 
and neural manifestations of reward sensitivity increase between childhood and adolescence, 
peaking in late adolescence, and decline thereafter. On the other hand, psychological and neural 
reflections of improved cognitive control increase gradually and linearly throughout 
adolescence and early adulthood. What this suggests is that adolescents are more prone than 
other age groups to engage in risk-taking behavior.  
While providing important insights into the biological and maturational processes that can 
affect cognition and behavior, such perspectives fail to take account of  life-course events or 
any socio-structural, situational or institutional influences. Bushway et al., (2001) argue that 
understanding desistance as a process rather than as an end-point problematises the idea of age 
as a causal explanation of desistance, particularly from a developmental perspective. As 
Maruna (1997 p.3) put it, ‘age indexes a range of different variables, including biological 
changes, social and normative transitions, and life experiences, and in itself is not an 
explanation for change’. Focusing on ageing and maturation as a universal or natural 
phenomenon also fails to accounts for differences in individuals’ pathways to desistance. 
Critically, it divorces the individual from the context within which these developmental 
changes occur by  ignoring the role of relational, cultural, social or structural processes.  
Rational Choice Theories 
Rational choice theories (Clarke and Cornish, 1985; Cornish and Clarke, 1986) suggest that an 
individual’s decisions to desist are motivated by the pursuit of an alternative future that does 
not involve offending (e.g. Paternoster, 1989; Paternoster and Bushway, 2009; Soyer, 2014), 
perhaps due to an aversive experience (Haggard, Gumpert and Grann, 2001) or in response to 
an accumulation of unfavourable experiences (Cusson and Pinsonneault, 1986). Essentially, 
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this line of reasoning suggests that the decision to desist is based on a conscious reappraisal of 
the costs and benefits of crime.  
 
In similar vein, Paternoster and Bushway (2009) developed an 'identity theory of criminal 
desistance’ which is a principally cognitive, rational choice and individualistic model of the 
desistance process. They suggest that people make a conscious decision to change based on 
increasing dissatisfaction with their life, characterised as a ‘crystallization of discontent’ (p. 
1121) which becomes conceptually linked by the person to an anticipated future, and weighed 
up against a self as a future non-offender. This recalculation induces motivation to change. In 
a departure from social and structural theories (discussed below) they view any movement 
towards ‘social institutions’ such as marriage or employment, for example, as coming after the 
process of (identity) change has been initiated. The authors reason that, after a decision to desist 
has been made, the desister engages in a deliberate and intentional realignment of their social 
network towards more pro-social others: However, in focusing on changes in network 
composition, and in polarizing social relations into either pro-social or anti-social others, the 
authors neglect to attend to the implications of changes in (existing) network dynamics and 
social  relationships and their role in triggering, enabling and sustaining desistance (Weaver, 
2015).  
Theories of desistance that focus on age and maturation fail to account for differences in 
individuals’ pathways to desistance and differences within and across crime types. They also 
elide the role of relational, cultural, social and structural processes, transitions and contexts. 
While, rational choice theorists recognise that the decision to desist is informed by individuals’ 
experience of, and involvement, in wider social institutions and processes, no explanation is 
offered as to how such processes might exert a constraint on either people’s decision-making 
or their capacities to realize these intentions. Nonetheless, rational choice perspectives usefully 
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depart from the determinism often implied by some theoretical accounts of desistance which 
focus on social and structural influences and which tend to attribute a more peripheral role to 
individual agency.  
 
Social and Structural Theories 
Social Learning Theories /Differential Association 
Social learning frameworks, which offer explanations for involvement in and desistance from 
offending, suggest that factors associated with onset of offending cohere with those of 
desistance (e.g. Cromwell, Olson and D’Aunn,1991; Wright and Cullen, 2004; Warr, 1998). 
Factors associated with desistance include, for example, differential association with non-
criminal peers and significant others, less exposure to, or opportunities to model or imitate, 
criminal behavior, the development of attitudes favorable to desistance, and differential 
reinforcement discouraging continued involvement in offending. The most important of these 
factors for desistance is, according to Warr (1998), disassociation or weakened ties to peer 
relations as a consequence of the transition to marriage. He contends that involvement in an 
intimate relationship reduces the amount of time spent with peers although he does not 
elaborate on how or why this occurs. Rather, his explanation coheres around the outcomes, 
suggesting that when an individual disassociates from their peer network they may lose both 
the motivation and the means of committing certain types of criminal behavior. Laub and 
Sampson (2001) suggest that in the absence of a mechanism explaining desistance from crime 
in Warr’s analysis, alternative explanations for the observed relationship between marriage and 
desistance could account for this phenomenon. 
 
Informal social control theories 
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Social control theorists suggest that informal ties to ‘institutions of social control’, whether 
family, education or employment, particularly in early adulthood, can encourage desistance 
(Laub and Sampson, 2003). Therefore, unlike maturational theories, this would imply that such 
transitional experiences are not necessarily universal and they can be under the control of the 
individual, in terms of getting married for example (Laub and Sampson, 2001). The theorist 
most closely identified with control theory is Hirschi (1969) but current formulations of control 
theory can be attributed to the framework developed by Matza (1964). Matza’s (1964) notion 
of a ‘drift’ centred on attachment, or otherwise, to social bonds; he suggested that most young 
people engaged in offending are caught somewhere in between the social bonds of adulthood 
and peer subcultures without a deep attachment to either, and that where adult roles become 
available, young people are likely to desist. Laub, Nagin and Sampson (1998) emphasize the 
‘independent’ and ‘exogenous’ impact of these bonds. They argue that these triggering events 
can occur, at least in part, by ‘chance’ (ibid p.225) or by ‘default’ (Sampson and Laub, 2004), 
rather than simply as an outcome of an individual’s rational decision-making or personal 
preferences. More generally, they suggest that employment and marriage confer obligations 
and expectations on the individual that generate informal controls through a network of social 
bonds, regardless of prior individual differences in criminal propensity.  
 
Theoretical explanations, however, have a tendency to generalize and over-simplify 
explanations of desistance where empirical research reveals a more nuanced, complex and 
contingent depiction of the sequencing, impacts and effects of key social relations at the level 
of the individual (for a review see Weaver, 2015).  This body of research suggests that key life 
events such as marriage, parenthood or employment are indeed likely to be shaped by, although 
not necessarily causal of desistance. The socio-historical and cultural contexts of research 
samples have also come under increased scrutiny as a lens through which to understand the 
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impact of cultural, normative, transitional or developmental life course events on desistance 
since Laub and Sampson (1993) advanced their age graded life-course theory of crime based 
on the then ageing sample originally informing the Glueck’s research in the 1940s (see for 
example Bersani, Laub and Nieuwbeerta, 2009; King, Massoglia and Macmillan, 2007; 
Lyngstad and Skardhamar, 2011; Monsbakken, Lyngstad and Skardhamar, 2012; Skardhamar 
and Savolainen, 2012; Savolainen, 2009). These and other studies draw attention to how 
different cultural and structural contexts and socio-economic changes affect how key social 
relations, such as marriage or employment are experienced, the normative expectations 
attributed to these social relations, and their related impacts on behavior. 
 
Other critiques of informal social control theories refer to an over-reliance on male samples 
with research evidence suggesting that the impact of social ties to marriage and employment 
on criminality is less evident for women (Giordano et al., 2002; King et al., 2007; Kreager, 
Matsueda and Erosheva, 2010, Maruna, 1997). For example, Monsbakken et al., (2012) 
hypothesize that the different gendered social control effects of marriage on desistance might 
reflect the normatively-informed controls stemming from women’s friendship and family 
networks throughout the life course; they argue that for women, marriage heralds no new 
mechanisms of social control and therefore engenders less change promotive effects. Similarly 
problematizing a social control interpretation of the role of employment in influencing 
behavioral change is Skardhamar and Savolainen’s (2012) quantitative research on the timing 
of behavioural change and participation in employment, which identified that employment 
emerged after individuals had ceased offending. Rather than triggering desistance, Skardhamar 
and Savolainen suggest that participation in employment emerges as a consequence of 
desistance. Indeed, it is increasingly acknowledged that employment in and of itself does not 
produce or trigger desistance as theories of informal social control imply; rather it is the 
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meaning and outcomes of either the nature and/or quality of the work or participation in 
employment and how these influence an individual’s self-concept and social identity and how 
these interact with a person’s priorities, goals and relational concerns that can explain this 
relationship (Weaver, 2015). 
  
What the theoretical frameworks discussed thus far share is recognition of the various 
correlations between, for example, marriage, parenthood, employment and desistance but their 
impacts and effects are often explained in reference to a variety of criminological theories and, 
in particular, life course (Loeber and Le Blanc, 1990), rational choice (Cusson and 
Pinsonneault 1986, Paternoster and Bushway, 2009), social control (Laub and Sampson, 2003; 
Sampson and Laub, 1993) and social learning theories (Warr, 1998). While social and 
structural theories variously recognize and explain the role of social institutions in the 
desistance process, they fail to illuminate how social structures or institutions shape decisions, 
under-analyzing, if not neglecting, how the individual perceives and responds to such 
influences, to which interactionist theories attend. 
 
Interactionist Theories 
The preceding analysis has illustrated that desistance cannot be readily reduced to the influence 
of either internal or external factors. Indeed, an increasing number of desistance theories 
conceptualize the desistance process as an interaction between, or integration of, agentic and 
structural factors, drawing on narrative accounts of individuals’ desistance processes. In these 
‘interactionist’ theories, desistance occurs as the outcome of an individual seeking to alter their 
socio-structural context, and in so doing acquiring new behaviors and new pro-social roles, or 
vice versa, variously resulting in associated shifts in the individual’s personal and social 
identity (see for example Bottoms et al., 2004; Dufour et al., 2013; Farrall, 2002; Farrall, 
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Bottoms and Shapland, 2010; Giordano et al., 2002; Healy, 2013; Maruna, 2001; Maruna and 
Farrall 2004; Uggen, Manza and Behrens, 2004). These theories of desistance place differing 
emphases on the role of individuals and their social contexts, tending to place explanatory 
weight on the discovery and exercise of agency and changes in personal identity and 
perceptions of social identity. Rather than, for example, analyzing how employment exerts 
informal social control, theories under this classification recognize that employment plays a 
significant role in shaping personal and social identities, which has important effects on 
people’s behaviors (Weaver, 2015). 
Desistance theorists have sought to identify which changes at the level of personal cognition 
(see for example Giordano et al., 2002) or self-identity and self-concept (Burnett, 1992; 
Graham and Bowling, 1995; Maruna 1997; Shover, 1996) might precede or coincide with 
changes in social bonds (LeBel et al., 2008). In contrast to control theories, cognitive or agentic 
explanations suggest that role transitions occur ‘subsequent to the emergence of a cognitive 
openness to change that spurs interest in both marriage and reform’ (Siennick and Osborn, 
2008 p.169-70) (see relatedly Paternoster and Bushway, 2009). LeBel et al., (2008) relatedly 
reasoned that ‘subjective changes may precede life-changing structural events and, to that 
extent, individuals can act as agents of their own change’ (ibid p. 155).  
Such theories suggest that ‘turning point’vii events may have a different impact depending on 
the actors’ level of motivation, on readiness to reform, and on their interpretation or assignation 
of meaning to the events. Giordano et al., (2002), for example, develop a symbolic 
interactionistviii perspective on desistance as a counterpoint to Sampson and Laub’s (1993) 
theory of informal social control using a mixed method study design which included life history 
narratives to propose a four-part theory of ‘cognitive transformation to ‘provide more 
specificity about mechanisms of change’ (Giordano et al., 2002 p.1004). Giordano et al., (2002 
p.1000) argue that the desistance process involves the following four stages:  
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1. ‘…a shift in the actor’s basic openness to change’;  
2. ‘…one’s exposure to a particular hook or set of hooks for change’ (ibid p.1000) and 
‘one’s attitude toward [it]’ (ibid p.1001).  
3. The envisioning and fashioning of ‘an appealing and conventional ‘replacement 
self’’ (ibid p. 1001);  
4. ‘…a transformation in the way the actor views the deviant behaviour or lifestyle 
itself’ (ibid p.1002).  
Giordano et al., (2002 p.1026) state: ‘on a continuum of advantage and disadvantage, the real 
play of agency is in the middle’; thus, agency is most significant where the objective odds of 
desisting are evenly balanced. Where this balance is offset other factors appear to be of greater 
importance. However, while Giordano et al’s (2002) theory, and indeed, many principally 
agentic theories of the change process, can elaborate the early stages of desistance, they cannot 
explain what triggers this cognitive transformation, or why one institution at one time rather 
than another exerts this effect, or why people remain in marriages or in jobs during challenging 
times when his or her investment in these social relations has diminished. 
King’s (2014) critical realist analysis draws on Emirbayer and Mische (1998) to reveal the 
dynamics of agency in the early stages of desistance based on the accounts of 20 people subject 
to probation supervision. Notably, he reveals the processes which led towards a decision to 
attempt to desist; the intended strategies that individuals considered in order to sustain 
desistance; the anticipated obstacles that individuals believed they would encounter and how 
they intended to overcome these. King reasons that during the transitional phases, individuals 
may begin to construct strategies for future action triggered by their perceived need for change 
and/or as an outcome of their reflection on their personal and social circumstances. In a 
departure from preceding research into the early phases of desistance (e.g. Healy, 2012), King’s 
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research revealed that the nature of agency in the transition to desistance is active and mutable; 
people adjust their goals and their strategies for realizing these goals in the light of incoming 
information and may, in turn, adjust their preferences accordingly. This reordering of 
preferences is, then, the result of a reappraisal of goals in accordance with their assessment of 
the possibilities and potentials that inhere in their social contexts. King therefore observes that 
individuals’ priorities change in accordance with the availability (or otherwise) of certain roles 
and resources, which produce different forms of agency and which result in different forms of 
action. Unlike rational choice theories, then, agency here is context dependent; agency is 
conditioned by an individual’s social context which delimits the range of future possibilities 
available by variously enabling or constraining change. However, while King’s analysis offers 
important insights into the relationships between agency, structure, identity, reflexivity and the 
desistance process, he is unable to explain what triggers this reflexive process in the first place. 
Following an evaluative review of agency-centered theories of desistance, Healy (2013 p.7) 
proposes an integrated framework for conceptualizing agency which also ‘elaborates on the 
mechanisms that operate at the intersection between structure and agency’ utilising Cote’s 
(1997) identity capital model. While Healy’s discussion does much to advance insights into 
concepts and constructs of agency, its interconnections with structures and its application to 
studies of desistance, like many other integrated accounts, it retains a somewhat solitary view 
of the self. While social bonds and social roles are referred to as enablements or constraints in 
identity formation and change, in its somewhat instrumental, resource-based formulation, the 
elision of the relational in Cote’s identity capital thesis (and, therefore Healy’s (2013) 
application of this in a desistance context) is arguably a significant short-coming, not least in 
its neglect to attend to how social relations motivate, enable or constrain decision-making and 
action and contribute to identity formation and change. 
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While, then, there is some consensus across desistance research that social relations, such as 
friendship groups, marriage, parenthood, and employment have a role to play in variously 
constraining, enabling and sustaining desistance, few desistance studies adequately analyze the 
dynamics or properties of social relations, or their relationship to individuals and social 
structures. Moreover, while, there is consensus that the desistance process is an outcome of the 
interplay between the agent and their structural context, the methodological focus is generally 
on individuals rather than groups even though the collective context within much offending 
takes place is well established (Weaver, 2015). This methodological focus on the individual 
precludes an analysis of the role of the group, as a social relation in and of itself, in shaping 
and affecting offending and desistance, and thus of how individual, relational, cultural and 
social contexts influence onset, persistence, and desistance. There is therefore a significant gap 
in criminological understanding of the impact that friendship groups (among other social 
relations) can exert on criminal careers – both empirically and theoretically. Weaver’s (2015) 
study of Offending and Desistance sought to address this gap in knowledge and understanding 
by exploring the role of a co-offending peer group in shaping and influencing offending and 
desistance by revealing the relational dynamics of co-offending and desistance through an 
exploration of the relationships between a naturally forming peer group and the wider social 
relations in which they individually and collectively participated over the life course. In taking 
social relations as a central unit of analysis, rather than solely the individual agent and/or social 
structure, through the lens of Donati’s (2011) relational realist social theory, this study 
identified the individual, relational, and structural contributions to the desistance process as 
they occur within and between individuals and, as part of that, the role of social relations in 
accounting for desistance over time. It showed how, for different individuals, these social 
relations (friendship groups, intimate relationships and families of formation, employment and 
religious communities) triggered reflexive evaluation of their priorities, behaviours and 
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lifestyles but with differing results. However, despite these differences, desistance from crime 
was a means of realising and maintaining the men’s individual and relational concerns (such 
as acquiring employment, sustaining and important intimate relationship, and/or being and 
becoming a father), with which continued offending became (sometimes incrementally) 
incompatible.  
 
The emphasis on concepts and constructs of agency and identity across interactionist theories, 
offers an important corrective to the comparatively deterministic accounts of desistance 
implied in age-graded, social learning and informal social control theories. In focusing on the 
interaction between structure and agency, they advance understandings of desistance beyond 
the rational choice and cognitive explanations advanced under ‘Individual Theories’ to 
illuminate the role of social structures in enabling or constraining agency. However, few 
accounts of the role of agency in the desistance process elaborate either what the process of 
reflexivity entails or how this process of reflexivity contributes to identity formation and 
change (notable exceptions include Dufour, Brassard and Martel, 2013; King, 2014, Weaver, 
2015). In so doing, many such theories fail to consider how, exactly, individuals’ reasoning 
and actions are variously enabled or constrained by the relational, cultural and social contexts 
within which these processes are embedded, and, arguably, this remains a limitation in and of 
desistance research. 
 
Situational theories 
While drawing on and informed by interactionist theories of desistance, Bottoms, (2014) 
observes that the situational and spatial dynamics of desistance, while barely featuring in the 
criminal careers literature, deserve attention in their own right.  As Flynn (2010) observed, 
criminality is decidedly situational in terms of the influences that social structures and social 
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relations, which inhere in the places that people inhabit, exert on various dimensions of their 
lives. Places, then, ‘are important generators of actions and not merely venues in which actions 
are performed’ (Bottoms and Wiles, 1992 cited by Farrall et al., 2014 p.160). In this vein, 
Bottoms (2014) reasons that people’s behavior can change when one or more features of their 
surrounding environment is altered, which might include for example changes in places of 
residence, the avoidance of criminogenic places and spaces and disassociation from peers who 
offend. Bottoms (2014) associates situational desistance with a particular form or manifestation 
of agency termed self-binding or diachronic self-control which is manifest in attempts to 
control potential future courses of action by consciously imposing certain constraints on one’s 
movements and associations which resonates with, although inverts, theories of routine activity 
theories of crime.  
 
Farrall et al., (2014) explore how desistance impacts on individuals’ everyday activities, 
including the spaces and places in which these occur. Echoing Bottoms, they reason that 
‘desistance is not just about no longer offending, it is also about adopting a different set of 
routines which take individuals to very different places from when they used to offend’ (ibid, 
p.160). Their analysis draws on geographies of time and space which explore the routine and 
rhythm of a day or week (or longer time period), and the spatial dimensions in which these 
routines occur, which, they recognize, are themselves shaped and influenced by wider social 
institutions. For example, they found that desisters, unlike persisters, ‘appeared to consciously 
create routines for themselves and others’ (Farrall et al., 2014 p.173) not least in terms of family 
routines or work related activities. While most of their persisters were unemployed, some 
persisters’ lives were also structured around family responsibilities, but they observed a 
qualitative difference in levels of enthusiasm for, or ‘emotional engagement’ (ibid, p.174) in 
these routines reflecting levels of perceived voluntarism towards family roles and 
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responsibilities. They observed, thus, that shifts in ‘time space routines’ (ibid, p.164) reflect 
wider transformations in the spheres of family and work. 
However, it is not just the place but the character of a place which is partly determined by its 
other inhabitants. ‘The explanation given by the likes of Meisenhelder (1977) and Goffman 
(1963) is that the places where an individual lives out his or her life, communicate some 
element of ‘who’ they are and ‘what’ they do’ (Farrall et al., 2014 p.162). Farrall et al., observe 
that routines also inform both personal and social identities to the extent that they communicate 
that there is something different about who they are now which can also inform ideas about 
who they can become in the future. In this vein, the authors identified a shift in people’s 
relationships to and the meaning associated with specific places in accordance with both 
processes of change (i.e. in terms of avoiding specific places or accessing new ones) and 
processes of maturation (i.e. characterized by a shift in preferences). Thus, there is an important 
relationship between selfhood and place and the way in which place becomes imbued with 
meaning and in turn, the way in which place infers something of the self; in both senses identity 
is shaped through the social interactions that inhere in place and space (Farrall et al., 2014; 
Flynn, 2010). Farrall et al., (2014) conclude that the temporal and spatial dimensions of human 
activities ‘reflect the interaction of one individuals’ priorities, the priorities and requirements 
of the institutions they are engaged with, and the longue duree influences of ‘historical’ time 
(Farrall et al., 2014 p.164). In particular, they suggest that the spatial dynamics of desistance 
can be understood as working on two levels. ‘Moves within towns or cities appeared to be part 
of the story of desistance for non-drug-injecting desisters, and were associated with moves 
away from particular parts of the city where crime was common and in which they had a name 
and a reputation to defend’ (ibid, p.185). On the other hand, ‘moves between towns or 
cities…were a feature of the narratives of reform for desisting drug users (and the opposite – 
that is locational stability and persistence – was observed too)’ (ibid).  
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Situational theories, as a classification of theories of desistance, are less established and 
comparatively under-explored by empirical studies than those previously reviewed, but they 
have much in common with interactionist theories, in their attention to questions of identity 
and agency, and the interaction between agency and social contexts and the attendant effects 
on people’s behaviours. At the same time, they add a new dimension to interactionist theories 
by focusing on the situational and spatial elements of desistance, that barely feature in other 
theories of desistance. 
Concluding Discussion 
This article has reviewed dominant theories of and research into desistance from crime, to 
produce a critical and comprehensive analysis of past and current thinking in this area. In so 
doing, the article has discussed the various definitions of desistance and the competing, yet 
often overlapping, theoretical explanations of desistance. Critically, no one theory can 
adequately explain how and why people stop offending in general, but each of the theories can 
shed light on aspects of the desistance process. How that process is both realised and 
experienced will, while sharing commonalities with other people, vary by individual. The 
dynamics of desistance thus have to be understood in the individual, relational, cultural and 
structural contexts within which these behaviours are embedded and sustained at the level of 
the individual. It has also been observed that in seeking to identify what supports desistance, 
theories of and research into desistance have paid considerably less attention to what constrains 
it (e.g. Farrall et al., 2014; Nugent and Schinkel, 2016). 
Additional to the theories and research reviewed here is a smaller but important body of work 
that explores the impact and effects of correctional or criminal justice interventions on 
pathways to and processes of desistance and reintegration (for a brief review of this literature, 
see Weaver, 2015). To what extent desistance research has, in turn, adequately or effectively 
influenced and impacted on criminal justice policy and practice is debatable. It might be 
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suggested that it has, in the U.K at least, offered an important corrective to the otherwise risk 
focused and individualistic approaches that largely typify contemporary practice. By the same 
token, it might be argued that theories of desistance tend to overlook psychological  and 
cognitive theories of change which have otherwise dominated approaches to rehabilitation in 
both policy and practice. It remains the case, however, that interpretations, in policy and 
practice, of desistance processes are prone to being over-simplified, generalized, 
decontextualized and individualistic which has left this body of research vulnerable to such 
critiques (Graham and McNeill, 2017). Like other terms, such as ‘empowerment’ or ‘co-
production’, the appropriation and application of the terms ‘desistance’ and ‘supporting 
desistance’ means that it is often applied to very different activities, underpinned by different 
ideologies and objectives, and is, thus, at risk of being diluted and devalued where it is 
misapplied or misappropriated and this may account, in part, for the relatively limited impact 
that desistance research has had on policy and practice. 
As Graham and McNeill (2017) suggest, some of the critiques advanced in relation to 
desistance research, (that it is individualistic in focus and lacks attention to issues of gender, 
race and class, for example) are based on a less than nuanced and detailed reading of this body 
of work. Desistance research has been critiqued for its relative neglect of, for example, white 
collar crime (though see Hunter, 2015; Onna et al., 2014). Similarly, comparatively few 
desistance studies attend to desistance from sex offending; of those that do, the focus is 
overwhelmingly on people convicted of sex offending against children (e.g. Hulley, 2016; 
Kewley 2016; McAlinden et al., 2016). As such, diversities within and across crime types 
remain undeveloped. Indeed, as this review has attempted to reveal, research in this paradigm 
is not without its limitations and, as such, would be enhanced by increased attention to issues 
of diversity, and the application of intersectional research methods and analyses; analyses of 
divergences in desistance pathways and processes by crime type; and to the production of 
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critical and contextualizing analyses of the cultural and structural influences on both crime and 
desistance. Moreover, the focus on abstinence from offending and the lack of attention to social 
integration beyond desistance, have led some to ask the critical question: ‘what comes after 
desistance?’ (e.g. Nugent and Schinkel 2016, Graham and McNeill, 2017). A less 
individualistic, and longer term focus on experiences of desistance, and beyond, might usefully 
emphasize and evidence the impacts and effects of systemic, as well as socio-structural, 
challenges to realising the social integration of people with convictions, which, in turn, might 
potentially better inform and shape penal policy and practice. 
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i The author would like to thank Routledge for permission to reuse some of the material published in her book: 
Weaver, B (2015) Offending and Desistance: The Importance of Social Relations. Routledge 
ii For an overview of operational definitions deployed in a range of empirical studies see Kazemian (2007) 
iii For a discussion on the concept of intermittency, see Carlsson (2013) 
iv Fagan (1989) defined desistance as the ‘process of reduction in the frequency and severity of (family) 
violence, leading to its eventual end when ‘true desistance’ or ‘quitting’ occurs (ibid, p.380, quoted in Bushway 
et al., 2001). 
v Loeber and LeBlanc (1990, p.409) specified four components of desistance: ‘deceleration’, ‘specialization’, 
‘de-escalation’ and ‘reaching a ceiling’ thus conceptualising desistance overall as a process from more to less 
serious offending over time (LeBlanc and Loeber, 1998). 
vi Weitekamp and Kerner (1994) define termination as the time when the criminal behaviour stops permanently; 
in contrast, suspension is defined as a break in offending behaviour. They therefore view desistance as a process 
by which offending decelerates and exhibits less variety. 
vii As Carlsson (2012, p.4) elaborates, the impact of a ‘turning point’ is only really understood over time. To be 
clear, he argues that that it is not the event (i.e. work or marriage) that is in itself the change agent but the ‘way 
such changes under certain circumstances bring about other changes’ (Carlsson 2012 p.3). He conceptualises 
turning points as those ‘crucial [processes] in which new lines of individual…activity are forged, in which new 
aspects of the self are brought into being (Becker 1966:xiv)’. 
viii Symbolic interactionism suggests that people construct their identities as they evaluate others’ attitudes 
towards them (Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934). This process occurs within and through social interactions which 
are, in particular, communicative exchanges. 
                                                 
